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1.  INTRODUCTION
1
The term financial globalization refers to the process by which financial markets of various
countries of the globe are integrated as one. Financial globalization may also be defined as a
free movement of finance across national boundaries without facing any restrictions.   We
argue that financial liberalization is not alone sufficient condition for financial globalization.
Financial globalization requires the introduction of a worldwide single currency managed and
regulated by a single international monetary authority. The first age of unregulated financial
globalization, 1870s to 1913, when London arguably acted as the center of financial activity,
was a period that  can be categorized as  the  early stage of  development of  international
financial institutions and markets (Eichengreen and Bordo 2002). That period was marred by
a series of banking crises due to speculation, excessive lending, poorly managed funds, ill
regulated banking systems and non-disclosure of information. Interestingly enough, Keynes
(1971) depicted the 1870-1913 financial globalization in these terms: “The  inhabitant of
London could order by telephone ….. the various products of the whole earth …..adventure
his wealth in the  natural resources of  any  quarter of  the  world, and share ….. in their
prospective fruits and advantages ….. couple the  security  of  his fortunes with  ….. any
substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend …..
secure forthwith ….. cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country ….. supply of
precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters
….. bearing coined wealth” (p. 6-7).
The history of international financial sector development in the inter-war period, 1919
to 1939, was not a particularly happy  one either; in fact it was deeply scarred by the stock
market collapse in the late 1920s, followed by the Great Depression. The post World-War II
period was characterized by a number of financial controls and fixed exchange rates, at least
until up to the early 1970s. Banking crises were absent during the period from 1945 to the
early 1970s, although currency crises were in evidence (for example, the  1949 and 1963
sterling pound crises that led to the devaluation of the currency). From then onwards the
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process of financial liberalization began, and banking crises re-emerged in a new era of broadly
flexible exchange rates, which brought a free movement of capital. It is this period that it is
thought to be the latest era of financial globalization. It is, of course, the case that the degree
of financial globalization achieved in 1870-1913 was only achieved again in the 1990s (Prasad
et al, 2003, p. 60).
This paper seeks to examine the required condition for the emergence of the current
epoch of financial globalization. We argue that this condition is the regulation of financially
globalized markets. We proceed in section 2 where we examine financial globalization as a
process of deregulation. The requirements if financial globalization are examined in section 3,
before we discuss the problems of financial globalization in section 4. Financial regulation and
financial globalization are closely scrutinized in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the
argument and concludes.
2. FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AS A PROCESS OF DEREGULATION
The detrimental aspect of unregulated financial integration following the experience of  the
Great Depression was recognized by many countries across the World.
2  Accordingly, not
only developed, but also newly-formed, countries undertook various measures in order to
prevent financial instability.  It was recognized that to prevent the latter, there was a need to
control financial flows that were purely speculative in nature, and to ensure that possible
expansion in aggregate expenditure in the productive aspect of the economy was  not
constrained by inadequacies in the financial flow. Consequently, regulations within national
boundaries  took  the  form  of  preventing  financial flows  that  were  mainly  geared for
speculative activity. The specificity of the regulations may have differed from country to
country but the aim of those regulations was to ensure that credit would be allocated to
industry and trade (Sayers 1960, Basu 2002).
                                                
2 The terms “financial globalization” and “financial integration” need some clarification. We follow Prasad et al
(2003) in defining and distinguishing between these terms: “Financial globalization is an aggregate concept that
refers to rising global linkages through cross-border financial flows. Financial integration refers to an individual
country’s linkages to international capital markets. Clearly, these concepts are closely related. For  instance,
increasing financial globalization is perforce associated with rising financial integration on average” (p. 7). We
follow this terminology and distinction between these terms in this study.3
In addition to those regulations almost every country  made further provisions to
ensure that the productive sectors were neither constrained by  the price of finance nor by
inadequate financial flows. This often arose either as a result of lenders’ inadequate knowledge
about a particular sector, or as a result of borrowers’  inability  to  meet  lenders’ credit
standards. This can be explained by referring to the fact that financial markets operate in the
presence of uncertainty, and lenders ask for collateral or some form of security in order to
ensure that should borrowers default on loans, some alternative means exist to enable lenders
to recoup their loan capital. This is precisely what we have just referred to as credit standard
(see, also, Basu 2002).
3 As a result, the ceiling on interest rates was introduced in order to
ensure that  borrowers  were  not  constrained by  the  price,  and  specialized banks  were
developed to ensure that the lenders’ lack of knowledge did not prevent the financial flows to
specific sectors. Furthermore, in certain countries the government stood as guarantor, and in
other countries banks were instructed to reduce the credit standard requirements. That was
aimed at ensuring that certain groups of borrowers were not constrained by interruptions to
the financial flows that arose from their inability to meet banks’ credit standard requirements.
At the international level, a variety of controls were established in order to ensure that
the foreign financial flows were mainly concentrated on the productive aspect of  the
economy. In order to prevent a free financial flow and exit, those controls also embraced the
purchase of foreign currency.  In some instances, governments stood as a direct guarantor
between the foreign lenders and the domestic borrowers to ensure that the growth of local
                                                 
3 This is very much reminiscent of the “new” consensus “collateral,” which emerges when the assumption of
frictionless financial markets is dropped; see, for example, Bernanke et al (1999).  It is important to note that
most authors do not distinguish between collateral that essentially constitutes equity finance and collateral that
can meet the bank’s credit standard. This problem principally arises from the fact that banks often themselves
use equity finance as collateral when dealing with  large borrowers, but  would not  accept equity finance as
collateral when dealing with small borrowers. By equity finance we mean assets that are bought with the
assistance of the loan. This form of collateral cannot protect a bank’s principal.  This is simply because debt
repayment as well as recoupment of the principal will be tied up with the assets that are purchased with  the
assistance of the loan. The problem is if the return from the assets is  not  sufficient to  meet  the  bank’s
repayment, then these assets’ value is more likely to fall, thereby creating a problem for the banks to recoup the
principal from the sale of these assets. As banks conveniently change their definition of collateral for different
groups of borrowers, it became extremely difficult for the authors of the credit rationing literature not only to
explain why banks ration credit but also how they ration credit.  Subsequently, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) used
price as the signalling device to explain why banks ration credit, where they use two assumptions namely the
“adverse selection” and “incentive” effects, both of which assumptions deal with the psychological state of the
borrowers. However Stiglitz and Weiss do not use collateral as a rationing device.  See Basu (2002) for more on
this issue.     4
industries was not  constrained by  inadequate foreign financial flows  arising from  their
inability to meet the foreign lenders’ credit standard requirements.
The main objective of those regulations was to bring financial stability and to promote
governments’ economic and social objectives. This was the case for developed as well as for
developing countries. An important implication of those regulations was to undermine the
independence of the financial sector as a profit-seeking economic unit.  A further implication
was that, since banks were prohibited by regulation from advancing loans to certain areas of
economic activity, the opportunity for new institutions to emerge, in order to capture that
end of the loan market, arose. Banks’ share of  the  loan market fell as  a result, thereby
affecting the effectiveness of the traditional tools that had been used by monetary authorities
in the past to control the money stock at the national level (Basu 2002). This was mainly
because those new institutions were not subject to the same regulations as the banks. Policies
that were implemented in order to promote the access of smaller borrowers to the loan market
at a cheaper rate, largely remained ineffective. They also adversely affected whatever limited
access they may have had to the loan markets in the past.  Some serious doubts were also
raised, in particular about the merits of the ceiling on interest rates, as a vehicle to provide
loans to these borrowers at a cheaper rate (Basu 1989).
The ineffectiveness of those interventions in terms of bringing allocational efficiency
to the financial sector led one country after another to deregulate its financial sector.  The
view was taken that government intervention itself distorts the determination of the price of
loans, thereby adversely affecting not only the allocation of loans but also savings. This view
was originally put forward by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), and subsequently further
developed by Fry (1995, 1997), King and Levine (1993a and 1993b) and others.
4  It  was
argued that in the absence of intervention, market forces would determine the rate of interest,
which in turn would govern the allocation of loans. The presumption was that interest rate
plays a crucial linking role between savings, investment and growth rates, and government
                                                 
4 See also Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Levine and Zervos (1996 and 1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998),
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Saint-Paul (1992) who produce arguments along similar lines. However,
a number of studies, such as Arestis and Demetriades (1997),  Arestis, Demetriades and Fattouh (2003) Basu
(1994 and 2002), Diaz-Alecjandro (1985), Morisset (1993) and Singh  (1997),  who  point  out  that  the
propositions and results derived by the supporters of the financial liberalization thesis are neither empirically
nor theoretically tenable.5
intervention either distorts or de-emphasizes the role of interest rate, thereby producing low
savings and, thus, low growth rates.
2.  REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION
The crucial message of the financial liberalization thesis is that it is the lack of competition,
which brings inefficiency to the financial sector. Interest rate liberalization is a first step, but
it was recognized that this alone would not generate competition in this market, since this
market operates within the frame of oligopolistic competition. Consequently, not  only  is
there a need to increase the number of players in this market, but also to tap a larger pool of
savings, which a country may be required to seek beyond its own domestic boundary. To
increase the number of players there is a need to remove entry restrictions so that other banks
and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFI) as well as overseas banks can enter into this
market.  In order to tap a larger pool of savings, there is a need to remove controls over the
purchase and sale of foreign currency. There is also need to relax laws relating to takeover and
merger activities, and, consequently, the requirement arises to liberalize the external sector of
the financial system.  
A view thereby emerged, similar to that of the school of financial liberalization, that
government intervention in the foreign exchange market to determine the price of currency,
could cause a great deal of distortion in the allocation of exports and imports. So much so,
that an undesirable imbalance between imports and exports may ensue (Krueger 1974, Cordon
1981). This problem might have been further aggravated by the undue restriction on foreign
direct investment. That may have caused debt to rise to an unnecessarily high level which
otherwise could have been addressed via foreign direct investment. The important implication
of all that was that if the currency were  allowed to  float,  then  the  mechanism of  its
appreciation and depreciation would ultimately bring a balance between exports and imports.
This is, of course, the familiar adjustment process known as the J-curve effect, according to
which devaluation would initially adversely affect the current account deficit, but after that it6
would improve the situation continuously (Cordon 1981). Any remaining trade imbalance
could be addressed via directly inviting foreign direct investment.
Accordingly, country after country joined the currency float fashion and the removal
of financial controls. Also laws relating to takeover and merger activities were relaxed in
anticipation that the threat of a takeover may improve the performance of those otherwise
not performing as expected. In other words, the external sector of the financial system  also
had to be liberalized. Internal and external liberalization of the financial sector was undertaken
with the expectation that this  would bring efficiency to  this  sector. This  in turn  would
improve the growth performance of those countries, and in the process it would open up the
opportunity for financial capital to move freely from one country to another. The speed of
that movement was further enhanced by the advancement in information technology. The
combination of these latter two developments has given the impression that  the  financial
markets are now perhaps truly globalized.
However, the problem with true globalization is that integration of the whole world
should take place into one, in the sense that different parts of the globe should be merged into
one.  In the case of financial globalization, this means lending and borrowing countries should
be merged into one market. Assuming such a process has indeed began as the free movement
of finance may indicate, then liberalization has removed one barrier. At the same time, though,
this has also brought a series of financial crises.
5 Although these financial crises are similar to
those that were observed between 1870 and 1914, their magnitude, and frequency, has been a
great deal larger. The following question emerges at this stage: could the experience of that era,
whereby the process of integration brought crises, itself be conceived as a serious constraint
to the financial process? The problem is that the process of integration requires development
of international institutions and the introduction of a single currency. The vital importance of
both has been over looked so  far. The  need for the  development of  a global institution
                                                 
5 The experience of that era has produced an interesting view that “developing countries need to have a set of
preconditions in place to benefit from financial globalization and to avoid an increased probability of a currency
or banking crisis” (Dawson, 2003, p. 9). The main elements of this “cautious” approach, supported by the IMF,
are: “First, the long end of the market should be opened up before the short – that is, foreign direct investment
should come before portfolio flows. There may be a case for imposing  or retaining some capital controls,
especially price-based controls on short-term flows …..  Second, the institutional and regulatory regime in the
financial sector is very important. A strong prudential regime should be in place before the capital account is
fully liberalise” (Dawson op. cit., p. 10).7
principally arises from the fact that there is a need for  a  player  to  perform  a  central
coordinating  and  regulatory  role  between  borrowing  and  lending  countries’  financial
institutions. For this coordination, rules have to be developed which all participating parties
should accept. A vital aspect of such a rule is the regulation of the globalized financial system.
We are far from having such a rule, let alone an appropriate institution to implement it. We
return to this all-important aspect below.
Furthermore, and perhaps of equal importance, there is a need to introduce a single
international currency. This is necessary for the two following reasons. The first is related to
the existence of different currencies across the globe itself signifies that the market is not
integrated but segregated. This segregation principally arises from the fact that different
currencies carry different degrees of convertibility in the international market. As a result,
currencies, which carry a low degree of  convertibility, would  have  to  be  converted to
currencies with relatively high degree of convertibility. Foreign loans is a case in point, in that
when they have to be paid in currencies of those countries which carry a low degree of
convertibility, this process inevitably limits the process of globalization. This is so for the
simple reason that access to the foreign loan market will be crucially determined by a limited
number of countries. The countries that would qualify in fact would be those countries with
sufficient export sectors earnings, which would determine their capability to repay the loan in
foreign currencies. This means only the export sector of these countries would be integrated,
the remainder of the domestic market will fall outside the orbit of globalization.
The second reason for the need to introduce an international single currency, relates to
the problem that arises from the fact that loan markets operate in the presence of uncertainty.
In this market, therefore, lenders are required to introduce a credit standard, which includes
collateral or some other form of security, as an alternative means of payment, should the
projects’ return not  be sufficient to  meet the  debt  obligation. The  existence of  different
currencies with different degrees of convertibility in the international markets also causes a
problem in introducing uniform credit standard across the globe. For the international financial
markets, domestic borrowers are required to have an international marketable asset in order to
meet  international  credit  standard  requirements  against  which  they  can  obtain  loans.8
Currencies with a relatively high degree of convertibility are able to offer a range of acceptable
international marketable assets, and as a result there is hardly any difference in their domestic
and international credit standard requirements. By contrast, currencies with a relatively low
degree of convertibility, are faced with a difference between domestic and international credit
standard requirements. This segregates the domestic financial markets from the international
financial market. A real difficulty then ensues not only in that  a uniform credit standard
across the globe cannot be introduced, but also that different countries have varying degrees of
access to international financial markets.  
4. PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION
Three problems are evident in the process of financial globalization. The first is that since the
degree of currency convertibility power is low for all the developing countries, all their foreign
loans have to be paid in foreign currency.  In this situation, it is reasonable to assume that
only the exporting sector is able to meet the international credit standards, since it is this
sector that can offer international marketable assets, in view of its potential to earn foreign
currency.  But this is where the serious problem begins in the process of globalization. The
problem here is a critical one. Since all the foreign loans have to be paid in foreign currency in
the case of developing countries, only the assets of their exporting sector are acceptable in the
international credit standard requirements. Not only does this limit the process of integration,
but it also introduces another problem. The problem is that if the foreign loans are not used
for the enhancement of export facilities, then the loan repayment no longer depends upon the
project performance. This makes project evaluation irrelevant, and also implies that the credit
standard no longer remains as an alternative means; it  becomes the  principal  means of
repaying the loan.  In other words, credit standard no longer provides a security against which
the loans are issued. This may explain why indebtness in certain countries is continuing to
rise.
The second problem relates to the sufficient condition for integration, which is the
country’s ability to attract such financial capital (the analysis so far demonstrates that the9
necessary condition for financial capital to move freely between countries is  financial
liberalization). This possibility to attract foreign financial capital ultimately depends upon the
country’s ability to offer international marketable assets  as  a security  against which the
country can seek a loan. Furthermore, this access improves as the size  of  a  country’s
international marketable assets increases. Given the poverty of developing countries, it  is
reasonable to assume that their international marketable assets will mainly be comprised of
those assets whose earning directly relates to the exporting sector.
6 This means that apart
from a few industrialized nations, export-led growth economies will now have greater access
to this global financial market.
7 As the export-led economies’ growth rate rises, the value of
their assets, which are particularly owned by the export sector, also rises in international
markets. These economies, therefore, are able to borrow even more by offering a higher value
of assets. This incremental rise in the value of these assets also attracts capital to directly
purchase these assets with the expectation that they may make a profit from the expected
change in their price.
There remains, though, a serious inherent  problem  associated with  this  form  of
lending. This is the possibility that loans may be advanced with the agreement that in the
event of a default, the country would have to allow the foreign lender to sell their international
marketable assets to recoup the proceeds of the loan. It was not recognized, perhaps that the
repayment of the loan mainly in the case of developing countries, directly relates to  the
earnings performance of the internationally traded marketable assets. If the foreign loans are
not used for the enhancement of export facilities, then the loan repayment no longer depends
upon the project’s performance. It is rather directly linked with the earning performance of
the internationally marketable assets. In other words, these assets no longer serve the purpose
for which the credit standard was introduced. The reason being that the repayment of the
loans is not necessarily associated with project performance for which the loan was advanced,
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countries because it “should lead to the enrichment and growth of developing economies as global savings are
efficiently directed to capital accumulation in those countries where the marginal product of capital is highest”
(p. 5).
7  For example, the twelve main recipients of foreign capital in decreasing order were China, Mexico, Brazil,
Korea, Malaysia, Argentina, Thailand, Russia, India, Turkey and Hungary. For more details on this issue, see
Harris (1998) and World Bank (1997).10
but rather is associated with the performance of the alternative means to repay the loans. This
means repayment of the loan is independent of the project performance. In this case, capital
plays a purely redistributive role. Whether the loan has been used for the enhancement of
export facilities or not, the process will ultimately be locked into the global financial market
and the expected growth in the value of the emerging markets’ export sector.
The problem here is that if the expected growth rate does not materialize, then the fall
in export earnings will not only cause a problem for maintaining the  repayment  of  debt.
Furthermore, since the value of these assets is also linked with their earning potential, a fall in
expected earnings will also cause a fall in the value of these assets.  This in turn will increase
the credit risk to a very high level. In other words, a collapse in the assets’ value will no
longer be able to protect foreign lenders’ loan capital. This scenario can either be described as
over lending or over borrowing or else over investment. This situation can first lead to  a
banking crisis and then to a currency crisis.
A similar situation might have emerged during the last so called globalization that took
place during the height of the industrial revolution, where the demand for raw materials and
the expansion of railways led financial capital to move from one country to another. The
problem was expansion of the railways might have integrated the domestic economy, but the
repayment of the loans for the expansion of the railways depended on the export earnings
from the raw materials. This, however, alone was not sufficient and in the process this may
also have caused periodic over investment and led to the emergence of a variety of regulations.
In this sense, this globalization may not be altogether too different from the last one.
A  third  problem  is  directly  related  to  the  impact  of  financial  globalization on
macroeconomic volatility. This is another important dimension of financial globalization,
which has not received much attention in the literature. Indeed, it is particularly pertinent to
the developing countries in view of low levels of  physical  capital and inherently greater
volatility in their case, than in developed countries (a number of studies have dealt with the
apparent “declining” volatility of output in the U.S. and other developed countries; see, for
example, Blanchard and Simon, 2001; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). A recent study
(Kose et al, 2003) shows that while “volatility of output growth has, on average, declined in11
the 1990s relative to the three earlier decades ….. the  volatility of  consumption growth
relative to that of income growth has increased for more financially integrated developing
economies in the 1990s” (p. 4). This, however, happens only up to a threshold, defined as the
point in terms of which “improved risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing possibilities”
(op. cit., p. 4) entail clear benefits. Financial globalization, as measured by the ratio of gross
capital flows to GDP, is beneficial beyond this threshold. It would appear to be the case,
though, that financial globalization has heightened the risk of financial crises.  This  is
particularly relevant before the threshold just referred to is reached, for the very  obvious
reason that since financial globalization amplifies cross-country financial linkages, shocks are
transmitted more quickly across national boundaries than otherwise (Prasad et al, 2003).
The study by Prasad et al (2003) confirms these results. They concur with the
argument that “consumption is regarded as a better measure of well-being than output”  and
that “There is little evidence that financial globalization has helped developing countries to
better stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth” (p. 6). The evidence presented by Prasad
et al (op. cit.), which draws on Kose et al (2003), “suggests that low to moderate levels of
financial integration may have made some countries subject to even greater volatility of
consumption relative to that of output. Thus, while there is no proof in the data that financial
globalization  has  benefited  growth,  there  is  evidence  that  some  countries  may  have
experienced greater consumption volatility as a result” (p. 6).
The evidence presented in Prasad et al (2003) implies that a great deal of  caution
should be in order to unqualified support  for financial globalization. It  argues for “good
institutions and macroeconomic frameworks” should be in place before financial globalization
should be allowed at a grand scale. In terms of the optimal pace and sequencing of financial
globalization, this study laments the “unresolved tension between having good institutions in
place before undertaking capital market liberalization and the notion that such liberalization
can itself help import best practices and provide an impetus to improve domestic institutions.
Such questions can best be addressed only in the context of country-specific circumstances
and institutional features” (op. cit., p. 5). It stops short, though, of including in the definition
of “good institutions” the type of international monetary arrangements we suggest in the12
current study. We turn our attention next to  this  type  of  international institution, in an
attempt to elaborate on the issue upon which we have just touched.   
5. FINANCIAL REGULATION
The existence of an international financial institution with sufficient power should be able to
play the leadership role required to alleviate the problems to which we have alluded in our
analysis above. The current international institutional arrangements do not appear to provide
a global financial institution, which is prepared to play  such a central co-ordinating role.
Historically speaking, the only time the world ever came close to such a situation was during
the late 19th century, when Britain was able to  play  a crucial and central role in world
financial markets. Since then an attempt might have been made in 1944 but it collapsed in
1973, with the abolition of the fixed exchange rate by the U.S.. This led to the emergence of
regionalism, which is perhaps still in a transitional phase (Harris, 1998).
Even if we assume that there is no need for such an institution, a problem still remains
with integration. This problem principally arises from the lack of a single currency, in the
absence of which it  is  not  possible to  bring uniformity in the  implementation of  credit
standards. As the loan market operates in the presence of uncertainty, there is a need to
introduce credit standard in order to ensure that should the borrowers’ project fail for which
the loan was advanced, there remains an alternative means to repay the loans. This problem
principally arises from the fact that integration requires individual nations to have the ability
to attract financial capital, which is independent of external barriers. Integration is then mainly
determined by the internal state of the economies of the countries concerned and the future
opportunities these economies can offer. Another important ingredient to this process is that
of removing the “home bias.” Greenspan (2003) discusses this issue and suggests that “A
clear benefit of financial globalization is that, to the extent that it reduces home bias, savings
will be better directed to the most promising investments in the  world, increasing global
economic growth and prosperity. However, so long as risk aversion exists and  trust  is
enhanced by local familiarity, we cannot expect that home bias will fully dissipate” (p. 3).13
The analysis that has been provided in this paper so far, suggests that unregulated
opportunities for financial free flow  between  countries  are  a  by-product  of  financial
liberalization. But this opportunity  for free financial flow between countries, does not alone
constitute financial globalization. To complete the process of financial globalization there is
need first to develop a global institution which can play  the central coordinating role, and
more importantly for the purposes of this paper, to regulate the system. In addition to this
requirement, there is a need to develop a single currency, which neither depends on gold nor
on any national currency.  It is the single currency that will allow global financial market to
develop a uniform credit standard requirement. As it stands at the moment, the export sector
of the developing countries has been used as a proxy to credit standard, which also acts as the
central means to repay the loan. Therefore, any negative performance of this sector would
produce difficulties in recouping the loan, which in turn will bring periodic financial crisis.
This aspect has been developed extensively above. The regulation aspect is the one that needs
to be further developed.
We maintain that  credible and  transparent  regulation, to  support  and  manage a
genuinely international single currency is paramount. Under current international institutional
arrangements, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can easily undertake this  function.
This could be implemented with very little cost, in terms of finance, non-human and human
resources. A revamped IMF can manage such operation in order to prevent major financial
crises through credible intervention, and help country lending and borrowing in a transparent
way. It should not be compelled to lend by powerful members or by borrowers who threaten
to  default,  a  most  prevalent  experience currently.  This  could  easily  be  achieved by
establishing a truly independent IMF. Indeed, such regulation may embrace those aspects
suggested by Keynes (1980) in his International Clearing Bank (ICB) proposals for the post
second World War II international financial order.
The main relevant elements of the ICB may be summarized: the establishment of a
truly international central bank with the power to issue a single international currency, the
Bancor in Keynes’s (op. cit., p. 72) terminology. The  Bancor should be “fixed (but  not
unalterable) in terms of gold and accepted as the equivalent of gold ….. for the purposes of14
settling international balances” (Keynes, op. cit., p. 72). The ICB should also be empowered
to intervene in capital and financial markets to provide sufficient liquidity for the needs of
international trade. National central banks would keep accounts with the ICB, so that normal
banking “account clearing” can take place. The idea and the principles of the ICB are really
very simple and are based on generalizing “the essential principle of banking, as it is exhibited
within any closed system. This principle is the necessary equality of credits and debits, of
assets and liabilities” (Keynes, op. cit., p. 72). Under these arrangements, the ICB “can with
safety make what advances it wishes to any of its members with  the  assurance that  the
proceeds can only be transferred to the bank account of another member. Its problem is solely
to see to it that its members behave themselves and that the advances made to each of them
are prudent and advisable from the point of view of the Union as a whole” (Keynes, op. cit.,
pp. 72-73).
A revamped IMF, along the lines of the Keynes’ ICB would issue an International
Clearing Unit (ICU) to serve as a medium of exchange and reserve asset. The ICB would issue
ICUs in return for gold, dollar and other reserves of member central banks. ICUs should only
be held by central banks, and in more general terms the ICB would operate as an institution
which periodically would settle outstanding balances between central banks. The ICA would,
therefore, be a “double-entry book-keeping clearing institution, providing overdraft facilities
so that unused credit balances could be mobilized efficiently and effectively. It should be
committed, along with member central banks, to guaranteeing one-way convertibility from
ICU deposits to domestic money.
A sister institution should also be created, here again a revamped World Bank. This
should be an International Investment Agency (IIA) with two specific aims. The first aim
should be to provide finance for investment, especially to the developing  and  emerging
countries, which need to industrialize in a way that does not enhance dependency on the
developed economies. The second aim should be to  provide  lending facilities to  enable
countries to avoid foreign exchange difficulties. This aspect of the  proposal  relies on  the
notion that countries are at different stages of banking and economic development and as such
they do not run continuously balanced current accounts. The IIA attached to ICB should15
provide the necessary lending to enhance investment opportunities of the borrowing country,
and in the case of developing and emerging countries such lending should  be  linked to
industrialization. Creditor countries should be expected to introduce appropriate  policies to
reduce their surpluses.
8             
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
This contribution can be briefly summarized. As the international economic landscape stands
at the moment, we are still a long way away from true financial globalization. A more recent
development is even more restraining for financial globalization. If the argument that national
stock markets moved on the whole in harmony in the period from roughly the early 1980s to
the beginning of the recent bear market (March 2000), an interesting implication follows. This
is that with the bear market entering its fourth year, there is evidence to suggest that stock
markets no longer move in harmony (as reported in the Financial Times, 22 April, 2003);
individual country risks becoming  an  important  factor  (witness  the  current  economic
performance in countries like Brazil and Argentina; see Financial Times, 24  April,  2003).
This, it is suggested, could very well mean that stock markets are “signalling a retreat from
globalization” (Financial Times, 23 April, 2003).
Financial liberalization alone does not constitute financial globalization. The process
of financial globalization can only be completed if a global financial institution is developed
and created that can play a central coordinating and regulatory role. Alongside such  an
international institution is the requirement for an international single currency, which does not
depend on any national currency. Such a currency will allow the global financial market to
develop uniform credit standard requirements. We have put forward the essentials  of  a
system that is necessary for a true financial globalization.  
                                                
8 See, also, Davidson (2003) for a proposal along similar lines as Keynes’s  (1980). Stiglitz (2002) argues for
substantial changes to the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, in a proposal to reform the global financial
system.16
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